Philosophical Atheism: A Review

 

Photo by Ed Robertson on Unsplash

 

Ernest Nage’s essay, “Philosophical Concepts of Atheism” appeared first in Johnson E. Fairchild’s 1959 philosophy anthology, “Basic Beliefs: The Religious Philosophies of Mankind,” and then, in 1997, in Peter A. Angeles’ “Critiques of God: Making the Case Against Belief in God.” Nagel stated that his purpose in writing the piece was to “show how atheism belongs to the great tradition of religious thought.”

“No!” I wanted to shout at the open book. “Atheism has no connection to religion beyond the suspension of belief in its claims pending sufficient evidence to the contrary.” I pressed on, determined to debunk Nagel’s tagging of atheism as a philosophy and a component of religious thought. Atheism, I would counter, is simply the disbelief in a god or gods. Nothing more. Nothing less. To call it a philosophy is like calling creationism theory a philosophy. Mere disbelief does not make a philosophy of atheism. To insist on the atheist philosophy argument play too easily into the laughable theist claim that theism is a religion.

"Philosophical Concepts of Atheism" begins with a definition of theism as the view “that the heavens and the earth and all that they contain owe their existence and continuance in existence to the wisdom and will of a supreme, self-consistent, omnipotent, omniscient, righteous and benevolent being, who is distinct from, and independent of, what he has created,”

That is a definition of a transcendent god, but it does not address pantheism. Did Nagel feel that pantheism was not subject to criticism? Or that it is not a part of “the great tradition of religious thought”?

Also, defining atheism as a philosophy presented a greater challenge that forced the author to break atheism into two categories and four sub-categories: (1) “those which hold that the theistic doctrine is meaningful, but reject it either on the ground that (a) the positive evidence for it is insufficient, or (b) the negative evidence is quite overwhelming; and (2) those who hold that the theistic thesis is not even meaningful, and reject it (a) as just nonsense of (b) as literally meaningless but interpreting it as a symbolic rendering of human ideals.”

That, too, aroused some kickback from me for the “or” in (1.a.) and (1.b.). Why not “and?” Can’t we question supernatural claims for both insufficient positive evidence and overwhelming negative evidence? Of course it can. I do not see why an atheist cannot hold both positions, and that (2.a.). is an added legitimate position. Nagel appeared to claim that the three positions are mutually exclusive. I contend that they are not.

 

It is when he takes on theists’ arguments for the existence of their god that his essay shines. He dismantled the argument from design, and the cosmological and teleological arguments. His thoughts on the ontological argument- the claim that because God is a perfect being, “he is one whose essence or being lacks no attributes.” Nagel’s debunking caused a problem: Repeating Immanuel Kant, Nagel said that “existence” is not an attribute. Understanding that premise is above my pay grade. Why is it not an attribute? His answer to the question requires a greater education in philosophy than I currently hold. So, I will put that into the category of “weak atheists’ arguments” until I can better understand the attributes of existence. And why it is not itself an attribute.

Moving on.

Speaking of weak arguments, tackling the argument from design is- for someone of Ernest Nagel’s intelligence, like shooting fish in a barrel (pardon the cliché). He first takes apart the watchmaker argument on which so much of the argument from design depends, and then he dismantles the “Divine Mathematician” segment of creationists’ insistence on filling any hole in scientific knowledge with a supernatural deity.

Then, we come to my favorite: the Problem of Evil. Apologetics for evil have been so thoroughly debunked that it would be redundant to discuss Nagels’ disposal of them. It, like the argument from design, is beneath Nagel’s attention. That he expended ink and intellectual energy on the topic can only mean that such apologetics were a common response to unbelief in 1959.

 

Having dismissed the common claims of evidence for a supernatural being or beings, Nagel turned his attention to his stated purpose in drafting the essay: to “show how atheism belongs to the great tradition of religious thought.”

 He wrote that “philosophical atheists have not shared a common set of positive views, a common set of philosophical convictions which set them off from other groups of thinkers.” On asserting that “there has never been a what one might call a “school of atheism,” he then sets out from there to establish a school of atheism. He rejects from discussion of philosophical atheism the “’village atheist’ whose primary concern is to “twit and ridicule those who accept some form of theism.” Those of us who have suffered gross and minor injustices at the hands of Christians for our refusal to join their club reject his rejection, Nagel’s off-handed dismissal rings hollow. The “village atheist” with some training in rhetoric can display the intellectual capacity to debate supernaturalism from a philosophical perspective, but he can also engage feral religion in metaphorical back-alley brawls.

He parses philosophical atheists into three major groups: (1) those which “reject the assumption that incorporeal agents can exercise a causal agency.; (2) atheists generally agree that “controlled sensory observation is the court of final appeal in issues concerning matters of fact,” a wordy way of saying that the empirical method (of which I considers methodological naturalism as a significant component; Nagel does not elaborate) is the final arbiter in disputes of fact; and (3) philosophical atheists “have generally accepted a utilitarian basis for judging moral issues. It is on this claim that I wrestle with. Years ago, I would have agreed wholeheartedly with that, but reading Ursula K. Le Guin’s short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” changed my mind about utilitarianism as a basis for morality, but I have yet to find its replacement.

In summary, “Philosophical Concepts of Atheism” offers effective arguments against the claims of the existence of a supernatural entity or entities but falls short of providing evidence that “atheism belongs to the great tradition of religious thought.” He wrote an otherwise brilliant essay that would have served better if his stated purpose had been to debunk common arguments for supernaturalism.

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Who Killed William Goebel?

 

William Goebel (photo: public domain)

 

“Assassination is probably the only enterprise where private industry is not more efficient” ― Pierce Brown, Iron Gold”

Governor William Goebel and his friends Frank Helm and the Kentucky state Attorney General W.J. Hendricks walked to Helm’s First National Bank of Covington, Kentucky, when they came upon John L. Sanford, who had been leaning against a metal rail as though waiting for someone. With his right hand in his pocket, he shook hands with Helm and Hendricks with his left hand, turned to Goebel, and said, “I understand that you assume authorship of that article.”

“I do,” Goebel said.

Sanford pulled out a firearm. He shot at the governor, piercing his clothing. Goebel drew his own weapon, fired once, and killed Sanford with a single shot to the head. Goebel pocketed his weapon, called is brother Justus, and turned himself in to the police. A previous threat by Sanford to kill Goebel and the testimony of witnesses to the shooting acquitted Goebel the charges of dueling and murder.

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The Goebel-Sanford feud began years earlier, when Senator Goebel introduced a bill that reduced tolls on Kentucky’s roads, bridges, and railroads, including the Roebling Bridge between Covington and Cincinnati, one of Sanford’s investments. In retaliation, Sanford arranged through powerful men to block Goebel’s chance for a seat on the Court of Appeals.

Later, Goebel moved three of Covington’s accounts from Sanford’s bank to Frank Helm’s First National Bank of Covington, further enraging Sanford., who then threatened to kill Goebel.

Sanford had practiced for some time a custom of the period in which citizens could post scandalous remarks about their enemies in newspapers. Goebel retaliated by posting a comment about Sanford in which he referred to his enemy as “John Gon — h — ea Sanford. The sexual disease insult resulted in Sanford’s assassination attempt.

John L. Sanford was not the Senator’s only enemy. Indeed, Senator-turned-Governor Goebel possessed an abrasive personality that attracted the ire of powerful men.

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Before he ran for office in the Senate, he worked in his private legal practice where he took on corporations and railroads. For fifteen years he fought against corporations who abused their power over workers and the widows of men killed in train wrecks. During those years, he never lost a case against the L&N Railroad, the most powerful corporation in the state.

On entering politics in 1887, the Senator fought for the rights of blacks, women, and the working class while fighting abuses by corporations. The company that suffered most from Goebel’s populist crusades: the L&N Railroad. Goebel sought to have railroads pay their fair share of taxes, to raise those taxes, and to curtail the L&N monopoly’s generous lobbying that gave the company immense power in state government. When a bill to abolish the state’s Railroad Commission came before the Senate, L&N President Milton H. Smith’s lobbyists spent lavishly to encouraged friendly legislators to kill the bill. On learning of the lobbyist’s influence, an investigative committee sought and failed to get an indictment against the lobbyists, but the bill to abolish the commission died in the General Assembly.

During the 1890 convention to rewrite the state constitution to comply with amendments to the U.S. constitution. Goebel included in the new document a provision that secured the Railroad Commission, the state agency that regulated railroads.

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In 1899, Goebel ran for governor or and won the Democratic Party’s nomination at the raucous party convention held at Louisville’s Music Hall that the New York Times described as “a continuous performance of howling farce. . . .” (Walker)

L&N’s chairman, August Belmont wrote in 1999 a letter to Goebel saying he would do all he could “to counteract the evil influence of your unjustifiable hostility.” He told Goebel’s friend, Urey Woodson, that He and his associates had spent 500,000 dollars to defeat Goebel. L&N’s president, Milton Smith, took charge of the campaign against Goebel’s run for governor.

Goebel told Woodson that, as his first act as governor, “he would ask for a special grand jury and get an indictment against Milton Smith and his cronies for criminal libel and put them in in jail for at least two years.” (Walker)

Kentucky Secretary of State Caleb Powers participated in (and allegedly organized) a meeting to plan an armed force from the eastern part of the state to descend on Frankfort to influence legislative action.

Goebel lost the election, but the Democratic State Central Committee found thousands of illegal ballots and asked for a recount that gave Goebel a leading edge in the race. The Democratically controlled General Assembly voted to give the election to William Goebel over William Taylor. Taylor sent out letters to friend to hurry to the capital. Many of those friends came from the rugged eastern mountains and arrived with weapons. Most of them came by way of fee passes on the L&N Railroad.

On January 30, 1900 — the day before Goebel was to assume office — he walked across the capitol plaza with two friends when a shot fired from the Executive Building struck him in the chest.

William Taylor seized control of the governorship, immediately declared a state of emergency, sent letters to friends requesting that they hurry to Frankfort, and called out the militia.

Democrats attempted to meet but were barred from the capitol by the militia. They met secretly at the hotel where Goebel lay dying and invalidated enough votes to declare Goebel as governor and John C. Beckham as lieutenant governor.

Over protests of his physicians, Goebel was sworn in as governor on his deathbed on January 31, 1900. He ordered the legislature to assemble and rescinded Taylor’s call to the militia. His order was ignored.

On February 1, 1900, Taylor signed vouchers to pay the militia (President Redman). Farmer’s Bank refused payment on the grounds that Taylor had usurped the office.

A court order restrained Taylor from interfering with the legislature. Alonzo Walker was deputized to serve the order on Taylor, but Taylor would not permit him to enter, so Walker tacked the order to the door, whereupon Taylor ordered the militia to apprehend him.

William Goebel died February 3, 1900. Lieutenant Governor John Beckham was sworn in as governor. The funeral train, February 6, 1900. On that day, Judge Moore ordered the release of Alonzo Walker. Taylor initially ignored the order but soon gave in. Goebel was buried with great pomp and ceremony on February 8.

Taylor withdrew the militia two days later. The legislature was permitted to meet for the first time since the crisis began.

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Surveyors determined that the shot came from Caleb Powers’ office. Warrants were issued for the arrest of Powers and John Davis, state Capital Square policeman.

“Governor” Taylor ordered the militia to deny Sheriff Sutter entry into the capitol to serve the warrants.

Powers and Davis escaped Frankfort disguised as soldiers and accompanied by twenty-five soldiers to Barbourville, a stronghold of the Taylor faction. Police chief Ross of Lexington stormed the train with his entire force and took Powers and Taylor prisoner after a desperate battle.

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In 1909, Governor Augustus E. Willson pardoned all parties involved in the Goebel assassination.

End

Sources:

[1] The Late Governor Goebel, Marianne C. Walker. HUMANITIES, July/August 2013, volume 34, Number 4. https://www.neh.gov/humanities/2013/julyaugust/feature/the-late-governor-goebel. Accessed 08/14/2019

[2] Nicholas C. Burckel, 1974, William Goebel and the Campaign for Railroad Regulation in Kentucky, 1888–1900 https://filsonhistorical.org/wp-content/uploads/publicationpdfs/48-1-5_William-Goebel-and-the-Campaign-for-Railroad-Regulation-in-Kentucky-1888-1900_Burckel-Nicholas-C..pdf citing The Louisville Courier-Journal, October 17, 26, 1899. Accessed 11/07/2021

[3] “Caleb Powers: United States Representative, Politician,” “The prosecution charged that Powers was the mastermind, having a political opponent killed so that his boss, Governor William South. Taylor, could stay in office.” https://prabook.com/web/caleb.powers/1060693

[4] “Goebel Shoots Sanford” www.nkyviews.com/Kenton/text/Goebel_shoots_sandford.html

 

 

Shareholder versus Stakeholder

 

Photo by Barnes & Noble

 

An interest in corporate greed and the corruption of the democratic system by corporations led me to the bookstore and there to scan Lynn Stout’s The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public. On closer reading, I found that I did not get what I expected from the book. I read, not a rant against Milton Friedman’s insane economic views, but a reasoned and sober review of the problem with the idea of shareholder primacy.

Lynn Stout (September 14, 1957-April 16, 2018) was at the time of publication of The Shareholder Value Myth, the Distinguished Professor of Corporate and Business Law at the Clarke Business Law Institute, Cornell Law School. Ms. Stout died at age 60 after a long struggle with cancer. She graduated summa cum laude from in 1979 and earned a master’s degree in public affairs in 1982, both from Princeton University; and a J.D. degree from Yale Law School also in 1982

 

Through news media and internet slop, I had been led by online news and social media to the belief that shareholder primacy was the corporate law of the land. That belief was shot down by the author by only the second paragraph and the fact is repeated throughout this, the last publication before the author’s death. Shareholder primacy (or shareholder dictatorship, as she referred to it at one point) is not corporate law. The book’s author established the fact with careful documentation and meticulous attention to detail. She established connections between the more infamous corporate scandals to the ideology of shareholder value, and yes, she made clear that shareholder primacy is an ideology.

Adolph Berle, an early proponent of that ideology in his 1932 publication The Modern Corporation and Private Property, had abandoned his position by the time of the 1954 printing of his The 20^th Century Capitalist Revolution (found here: https://ia804605.us.archive.org/31/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.190591/2015.190591.The-Twentyth-Century-Capitalist-Revolution.pdf). Economist Milton Friedman, however, didn’t get the word that shareholder primacy was a dead issue, or he disagreed with it, in the creation of the Friedman Doctrine through his 1971 New York Times article, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits” (https://yieldpro.com/pdf/infographics/2024/0910/friedman.pdf)

The book links various corporate corruption and criminality to shareholder primacy ideology; disasters ranging from the 2010 British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill to escalating CEO compensation that reached five hundred times that of the average employee by 2003. The rue professional, Stout pulls that off without a hint of rant or rave, but with well-researched references and a cool, detached voice. Her telling of the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court’s Dodge v. Ford decision and its relation to the myth of shareholder primacy as a legal requirement, alone, makes the price of the book a bargain. ($20.95 at Barnes & Noble https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-shareholder-value-myth-lynn-stout/1110855846?ean=9781605098135.)

 

Lynn Stout delivered on the book’s subtitle, How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public. She challenged Friedman’s opinion on the social responsibility of corporations by introducing the stakeholder: the debtors, contractors, employees, and the public. I found her argument convincing that “shareholders and debtholder alike have equal—and equally fallacious—claims to corporate ‘ownership.’” (Stout, 38)

She went from there to knock down the claim that shareholders are the “residual claimants” in corporations, that is, the party that has priority access to the residual profits of a corporation after it has met its legal obligations.

Ms. Stout packed a lot of punches into a thin book, covering such areas as the principal-agent model of corporate structure That model states that the owner of a business, assumed to be the shareholder, hires an agent, the manager(s) to run the business. The principal-agent model gained traction in the business world with the 1976 publication of a work by Michael Jensen of Harvard Business school and William Meckling, University of Rochester (Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure) The author knocks down that argument by pointing out the corporation’s responsibility to the stakeholder and role of the stakeholder in the corporate structure.

Before reading The Shareholder Value Myth, I knew only enough about corporate law to consider Milton Friedman’s and the Chicago School’s as intellectually unhinged. I thank Lynn Stout for providing solid framework to support that opinion.

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